A very interesting perspective I'm pleased to have read. For my part I've always maintained that it was the Royal Navy which won the First World War. For all the simplistic talk of Jutland being a German victory, in reality it was nothing of the sort. The German Navy fled the battlefield and never ventured to sea in force again for the rest of the war. When it did finally emerge it wasn't to fight the Grand Fleet again but to meekly surrender to it and sail into captivity at Scapa Flow, a now forgotten event but one of the greatest and most definitive naval victories in British history.
After Jutland the German Navy stayed in its harbours whilst Germany was starved into surrender. By the autumn of 1918 it had no option but to surrender as it had run out of food to feed the population and also run out of raw materials needed for further armaments production. There was civil disorder on the streets and if the Armistice had not come, outright defeat and capitulation would have come within months.
The Germans may have sunk more ships at Jutland than the British, and of course a few mistakes happened in the battle as happens in virtually every battle. But then the Germans also killed more Russians and destroyed more Russian tanks at Stalingrad and Kursk than the Russians killed Germans, however no one is silly enough to describe those battles as German victories. The same view should apply when looking at Jutland.
Hindsight and WWII gave we critics a different perspective on WWI tactics. It's easy to see the fallacy
of walking toward machine guns in line abreast. But professional officers should have been able to predict the effect of continuous machine gun fire against slow moving men. But it wasn't British generals alone. When Americans went into battle using the same tactics they suffered the same high casualties. Americans more than the British should have insisted on different tactics given the experiences of the civil war and battles against American Indians where opponents used cover to advance.
I think the generals were scapegoated by the popular cultural to expiate the blame that ought to be given to the newspapers for pushing for war. The same sort of people who tend be in theatre and film also tend to work for news media, so it's no wonder they seek to deflect criticism away for their social class.
Sir, I have a few items to place for consideration.
1. (tin foil hat) I think the "blame" of the 1960s was a deliberate strategy. It was the highest of the establishment placing the blame for the loss of lives on the command. In a sense, it was to wash the hands of the leadership to avoid blame (that would be invoked for current actions going on).
2. There is no doubt and movies such as "All Quiet on the Western Front" show, there WERE plenty of command that probably did treat their men as pawns. I agree that Haig wasn't so callous but it doesn't necessarily mean other leadership below him weren't. The point of the movie reference is that even in 1930, these issues were there. I think (and this goes to #1 above) this is why leaders felt the need to clear their guilt.
3. Much of my knowledge comes from the YouTube channel "The Great War." While I find them apologetic, they did an excellent job on the analysis on all fronts. I wonder if you have viewed any of their series? I should love if you'd do some analysis of their work relative to what you know. I think that would be interesting.
4. I found you analysis of the post-Somme a fascinating concept. I think it's precisely what the study of history is meant to determine.
5. The lessons of the War still don't change. It was a horrendous loss of a generation. I try to avoid the "blame" because it obscures the more prescient points you made, such as Agincourt's relevance on battle. This was another excellent draw of history, I felt.
6. I am going to throw up a point of difference here, is it not possible that the reason people had the opinions they did due to the propaganda of the time? Did this analysis not include other decisions that may have disproved your conclusion?
Please keep up the good work, sir. I greatly enjoyed this article as this topic is one of my favorites.
Unfortunately Haig appears to be a 'marmite' character; he is either loved it loathed. The truth (as I see it) is somewhat more nuanced.
I believe he was a poor choice as the Commander of British forces in the Western front, as he lacked the imagination for the role. He would have made a great No2 man as he was a great organiser, especially of training. ironically I believe he would have made a good CIGS as that was also a job that required more organisational ability than imagination.
He was a constant critic of General French's conduct of the early part of WW1 (when Haig was subordinate to French) but when French was replaced by Haig he employed the same tactics as French but on a larger scale. So your defence of Haig as getting a move on to keep his job is less clear cut than is implied.
Moreover, he constantly wanted the big breakthrough to permit the use of cavalry despite the overwhelming evidence that cavalry had no use in that conflict. Rawlinson had advocated for a bite and hold strategy from mid-war rather than pursue a decisive breakthrough. The bite and hold strategy was employed by the British army for the 100 days in 1918. Still the British Army's greatest series of victories in Europe.
Half was not held in universal esteem; Lloyd -George disliked him and is reputed to have planned to have him replaced with the Canadian General Currie (arguably the best General of WW1) with the Australian Monash as his Chief of staff. Half was save until that point because he had the confidence of the king.
There are many examples that we could discuss at length but I would recommend anyone t that is interested in mistake made in WW1 try To Important for the Generals by Allan Mallinson; a historian and ex-army officer who reviewed WW1 using information known at the time.
This is such a refreshing summary of WW1 and being born in 1945 with a grandfather who was at the Somme, you’ve restored by belief in what I was always told. Thanks Simon
Serried ranks, going 'hopping the bags' time and time again.
The night attack a mere 2 weeks after the disastrous First Day of The Somme.
The evolution of platoons into sections of bombers, riflemen, rifle grenadiers and Lewis gunners.
The creeping barrage.
Graze Fuzes for the artillery.
Tanks.
Armoured personel carriers.
Supply tanks.
Self propelled artillery.
The RAF parachuting supplies to forward troops.
The list could go on and on..just some examples of so-called 'stuffy inflexible generals' who were willing to innovate and adapt to the consequenses of modern warfare.
The British Army during the '100 Days' in 1918 was probably the finest army the world has ever seen. And yet no mention is made of these achievements, because it doesn't fit the narrative.
The reason why the British Army forms 3 ranks instead of 4 is down to Lloyd George and his hatred of FM Sir Douglas Haig.
He withheld manpower from the decisive front of the war, The Western Front, lest Haig wasted men, allowing the Germans to launch the ir,Spring 1918 Offensive, that very nearly won them the war.
The reduction from 4 x Platoons to 3 x Platoons per Company, and the reduction 4 x Battalions to 3 x Battlaions per Brigade, and the reduction of 4 x Brigades to 3 x Brigades per Division was down to this shortage of manpower.
Lloyd George nearly lost WW1 for the Allies.
A relative of mine died on 21st March 1918, the first day of the 'Kaiserschlacht', he served in the 16th Battalion MGC and has no known grave. He is commemorated at Pozieres.
Thank you, Simon. I had heard something about Haig (perhaps from you) but it’s good to have it fleshed out.
A very interesting perspective I'm pleased to have read. For my part I've always maintained that it was the Royal Navy which won the First World War. For all the simplistic talk of Jutland being a German victory, in reality it was nothing of the sort. The German Navy fled the battlefield and never ventured to sea in force again for the rest of the war. When it did finally emerge it wasn't to fight the Grand Fleet again but to meekly surrender to it and sail into captivity at Scapa Flow, a now forgotten event but one of the greatest and most definitive naval victories in British history.
After Jutland the German Navy stayed in its harbours whilst Germany was starved into surrender. By the autumn of 1918 it had no option but to surrender as it had run out of food to feed the population and also run out of raw materials needed for further armaments production. There was civil disorder on the streets and if the Armistice had not come, outright defeat and capitulation would have come within months.
The Germans may have sunk more ships at Jutland than the British, and of course a few mistakes happened in the battle as happens in virtually every battle. But then the Germans also killed more Russians and destroyed more Russian tanks at Stalingrad and Kursk than the Russians killed Germans, however no one is silly enough to describe those battles as German victories. The same view should apply when looking at Jutland.
Hindsight and WWII gave we critics a different perspective on WWI tactics. It's easy to see the fallacy
of walking toward machine guns in line abreast. But professional officers should have been able to predict the effect of continuous machine gun fire against slow moving men. But it wasn't British generals alone. When Americans went into battle using the same tactics they suffered the same high casualties. Americans more than the British should have insisted on different tactics given the experiences of the civil war and battles against American Indians where opponents used cover to advance.
My father was in WWI and 2.
I think the generals were scapegoated by the popular cultural to expiate the blame that ought to be given to the newspapers for pushing for war. The same sort of people who tend be in theatre and film also tend to work for news media, so it's no wonder they seek to deflect criticism away for their social class.
Sir, I have a few items to place for consideration.
1. (tin foil hat) I think the "blame" of the 1960s was a deliberate strategy. It was the highest of the establishment placing the blame for the loss of lives on the command. In a sense, it was to wash the hands of the leadership to avoid blame (that would be invoked for current actions going on).
2. There is no doubt and movies such as "All Quiet on the Western Front" show, there WERE plenty of command that probably did treat their men as pawns. I agree that Haig wasn't so callous but it doesn't necessarily mean other leadership below him weren't. The point of the movie reference is that even in 1930, these issues were there. I think (and this goes to #1 above) this is why leaders felt the need to clear their guilt.
3. Much of my knowledge comes from the YouTube channel "The Great War." While I find them apologetic, they did an excellent job on the analysis on all fronts. I wonder if you have viewed any of their series? I should love if you'd do some analysis of their work relative to what you know. I think that would be interesting.
4. I found you analysis of the post-Somme a fascinating concept. I think it's precisely what the study of history is meant to determine.
5. The lessons of the War still don't change. It was a horrendous loss of a generation. I try to avoid the "blame" because it obscures the more prescient points you made, such as Agincourt's relevance on battle. This was another excellent draw of history, I felt.
6. I am going to throw up a point of difference here, is it not possible that the reason people had the opinions they did due to the propaganda of the time? Did this analysis not include other decisions that may have disproved your conclusion?
Please keep up the good work, sir. I greatly enjoyed this article as this topic is one of my favorites.
It is unfortunately the case that these days the history the next generation see is courtesy of Hollywood and the BBC.
Unfortunately Haig appears to be a 'marmite' character; he is either loved it loathed. The truth (as I see it) is somewhat more nuanced.
I believe he was a poor choice as the Commander of British forces in the Western front, as he lacked the imagination for the role. He would have made a great No2 man as he was a great organiser, especially of training. ironically I believe he would have made a good CIGS as that was also a job that required more organisational ability than imagination.
He was a constant critic of General French's conduct of the early part of WW1 (when Haig was subordinate to French) but when French was replaced by Haig he employed the same tactics as French but on a larger scale. So your defence of Haig as getting a move on to keep his job is less clear cut than is implied.
Moreover, he constantly wanted the big breakthrough to permit the use of cavalry despite the overwhelming evidence that cavalry had no use in that conflict. Rawlinson had advocated for a bite and hold strategy from mid-war rather than pursue a decisive breakthrough. The bite and hold strategy was employed by the British army for the 100 days in 1918. Still the British Army's greatest series of victories in Europe.
Half was not held in universal esteem; Lloyd -George disliked him and is reputed to have planned to have him replaced with the Canadian General Currie (arguably the best General of WW1) with the Australian Monash as his Chief of staff. Half was save until that point because he had the confidence of the king.
There are many examples that we could discuss at length but I would recommend anyone t that is interested in mistake made in WW1 try To Important for the Generals by Allan Mallinson; a historian and ex-army officer who reviewed WW1 using information known at the time.
This is such a refreshing summary of WW1 and being born in 1945 with a grandfather who was at the Somme, you’ve restored by belief in what I was always told. Thanks Simon
This is a really fine article and certainly shone a lot of light on a subject about which I had not thought much before. Thanks very much.
Serried ranks, going 'hopping the bags' time and time again.
The night attack a mere 2 weeks after the disastrous First Day of The Somme.
The evolution of platoons into sections of bombers, riflemen, rifle grenadiers and Lewis gunners.
The creeping barrage.
Graze Fuzes for the artillery.
Tanks.
Armoured personel carriers.
Supply tanks.
Self propelled artillery.
The RAF parachuting supplies to forward troops.
The list could go on and on..just some examples of so-called 'stuffy inflexible generals' who were willing to innovate and adapt to the consequenses of modern warfare.
The British Army during the '100 Days' in 1918 was probably the finest army the world has ever seen. And yet no mention is made of these achievements, because it doesn't fit the narrative.
The reason why the British Army forms 3 ranks instead of 4 is down to Lloyd George and his hatred of FM Sir Douglas Haig.
He withheld manpower from the decisive front of the war, The Western Front, lest Haig wasted men, allowing the Germans to launch the ir,Spring 1918 Offensive, that very nearly won them the war.
The reduction from 4 x Platoons to 3 x Platoons per Company, and the reduction 4 x Battalions to 3 x Battlaions per Brigade, and the reduction of 4 x Brigades to 3 x Brigades per Division was down to this shortage of manpower.
Lloyd George nearly lost WW1 for the Allies.
A relative of mine died on 21st March 1918, the first day of the 'Kaiserschlacht', he served in the 16th Battalion MGC and has no known grave. He is commemorated at Pozieres.
"We will Remember Them".